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Abstract 
The public telephone network has been evolving from manually switched wires 
carrying analog encoded voice of the t 9lh century to an automatically switched 
grid of copper·wired, fiber optical and radio linked portions carrying digitally 
encoded voice and other data. Simultaneously, as our security consciousness 
increases, so does our desire to keep our conversations private. Applied to the 
traffic traversing the globe on the public telephone network, privacy requires 
that our telephone companies provide us with a service whereby unintended 
third parties are unable to access other's data. However, existing public 
telephone network infrastructures do not provide such a service. This paper 
shows a method to enhance the PSTN call processing model to provide end·to· 
end voice privacy and access control services within the boundaries of the 
existing public telephone network infrastructures. Proposed enhancement uses 
public and symmetric key cryptography. This work is a part of an on going 
project on securing telecommunication system architectures and protocols. 
Key Words: Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), Signaling System 7 
(SS7), Public key cryptography, Symmetric key cryptography, Certificate 
Authority (CA}, ANSI.41 (IS.41 ), Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM), Secure Telephone Unit Third Generation (STU III). Voice Privacy. 
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1 Introduction 
Wired or wireless voice communication, otherwise known as telephony 
plays an important role in our society. By lifting the handset of the telephone 
and dialing numbers, we can reach any other telephone in the world. However, 
as things stand today, an eavesdropper can easily monitor supposedly private 
telephone conversations. Thus, telephone calls need to be protected against 
eavesdropping. Existing security architectures in wire·line and wireless 
telephone infrastructures comes short of providing end·to·end voice privacy as 
well as access control for subscribers. Thus, the main objective of this paper to 
describe architecture that provides end·to·end voice privacy at the application 
layer with minimum modification of existing public telephone network 
infrastructures. Voice privacy is achieved by encrypting voice signals between 
two end telephones using symmetric keys and a one-time encryption key. This 
one-time encryption key is used to prevent replay attacks. We also propose 
imposing an access control mechanism for telephone subscribers and telephones 
that will be used for secure communications. Proposed authentication technique 
uses public key cryptography and provides authentication center the assurance 
that the telephone at the other end of the connection is what it claims to be. We 
will also show how to integrate proposed key distribution services on public 
telephone grids. 
Our proposed security enhancement for secure telephony will be 
implemented at the application service elements (ASE) layer of the Signal 
System 7 (SS7) protocol model, where exiting security architectures and other 
advanced intelligent network services in the wire-line and wireless network are 
being implemented. Proposed enhancement takes advantage of infonnation 
sharing taking place between the telephone companies to facilitate wire·line and 
wireless call processing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related 
work involved with the security of wire-line and wireless telephone networks. In 
order to make this paper self-contained, Section 3 provides a brief overview of 
SS7. Section 4 provides a detail description of the proposed security 
enhancement Sections 5 describe how to integrate the proposed security 
enhancement into call processing model. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Related Work 
Telephone services have been improving from old humanly switched analog 
encoded telephones to current day advance intelligent network applications. 
However, the security in wire-lines, otherwise known as public switched 
telephone network (PTSN) is stiU a major concern. Currently, PTSN does not 
have a system to protect against unauthorized eavesdropping of conversations. 
That is not to say there is no way to conduct secure telephone conversation in 
PSTN. There are several secure telephones that provide protection from 
eavesdropping in PSTN. These secure telephones are design to work only as 
dedicated pairs through public telephone network infrastructure and use 
predetennined symmetric keys. In addition, most of these secure phones address 
only the confidentiality part of the security services and not other security 
services such as authentication, authorization, and non-repudiation. An example 
ofa secure phone is STU III, discussed next. 
2.1 Secure Telephone Unit: Third Generation (STU III) 
Secure telephones widely used in the intelligence community, commonly 
known as secure telephone unit third generation (STU III), was developed by the 
National Security Agency (NSA) in 1987 [29]. It is uses symmetric keys to 
encrypt voice messages. These keys are downloaded and stored in the handheld 
telephone unit. STU III has an in-built key management system for customizing 
and downloading keys. Obtaining a STU III requires NSA's pennission. 
2.2 Wireless Networks 
Wireless communications are more susceptible to eavesdropping than wire-
line (Public Switch telephone Network) communication, because readily 
available radio scanners can easily monitor radio signals [12,28]. Because 
wireless signals are sent over the air using insecure radio channels, 
eavesdroppers can not only monitor the conversation but also obtain mobile 
station infonnation such as Mobile Identification numbers. Once this 
infonnation is known, it can be used to create a clone. Due to mobile station 
cloning, Wireless industry is loosing millions of dollars every year [22,30]. In 
order to address these security issues, wireless industry started to implement 
authentication lo protect against cloning and confidentiality (voice privacy) to 
protect against eavesdropping. 
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Authentication and confidentiality for wireless network are defined in 
ANSl-41 (IS-41) and Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
standards. Both IS-41 and GSM security are based on symmetric key 
cryptographic techniques where a secret key is shared between the mobile 
station and the authentication center in the network. Details of IS-41 and GSM 
security appear on [8,10.12,16). Both IS-41 and GSM security addresses the 
issue of wireless telephone cloning, but do not offer end-to-end voice privacy or 
subscriber authentication. 
3 Signaling Architecture of the PSTN 
Signaling architecture is responsible for transferring control signals between 
components of the telephone network. These control signals establish, maintain, 
release connections, and facilitate other managerial and bookkeeping functions 
such as accessing relevant telephone network databases (described shortly). 
Such signaling has been evolving since early days of manual switching of the 
19111 century. Presently, there are two kinds of signaling techniques that are used 
in the telephone network: Channel-associated (in-band) and Common-channel 
(out-of-band) signaling. There are two types of common-channel signaling: 
built-in separate channel and separate channel signaling. In built-in separate 
channel signaling, the signaling protocol is carried on separate channel on the 
same trunk that carries the voice signals. Examples of built-in separate channel 
signaling are the D channel ofISDN networks. In separate channel signaling. the 
signaling protocol is carried on a separate network. An example of separate 
channel signaling is signaling system 7 (SS7). 
3.1 Signaling System 7 
Signaling System 7 (SS7) is an out-of-band signaling standard for the 
telephone network developed by ITU-TS, and defines the architecture and the 
protocols of signaling network. It is the signaling systems used in PSTN. In 
order to make this paper self contained, the next section provides a brief 
overview of SS7, but details of SS7 appear in standard references such as 
[7,8,23]. 
3.1.1 The Signaling Network 
The signaling network is a separate network that carries the signaling 
messages between the SS7 components. There are three main components in 
PSTN: Service Switching Point (SSP), Signaling Transfer Point (STP), and 
Service Control Point (SCP). These components are arranged throughout the 
SS7 network in such way that the network provides the maximum performance, 
reliability, and nexibility. A simplified design of signaling network is shown in 
Figure I. Every SSP is connected to at least two STPs for reliability, and this 
design is known as a mated STP pair. A mated STP pair in one company is 
inter-connected with other mated STP pair of other companies. In addition, 
mated STP pair in one company can support SSPs of other companies. Every 






Figure 1. The Transport and Signaling Network In Public Telephone 
Network 
SSP is a part of the local switch, which connects the telephone to the 
telephone network, and it is responsible for processing regular and special calls 
that require remote database translation. SSP also provides support to back-
office functions such as configuration, billing, performance, error reporting, etc. 
An SSP in a wireless network is referred as a mobile-switched center (MSC). 
STP performs routing, and is responsible for routing signaling messages from its 
local SSP to destinations in the SS? network. SCP is a process with access to the 
intelligent network (IN) database, and is responsible for processing requests 
from the SSP and other SCPs in the network. STP transfers these requests and 
responses to/from SCPs. Every database provide services specific applications 
such as subscriber profile, mobile station profile, 800 number translations, 
security, calling card and other services. Some of the commonly used databases 
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are line information database (LIDB), home location register (HLR), 
Authentication, and call management service database (CMSDB). 
3.1.2 Signaling Protocol 
The SS7 protocol consists of a four-level hierarchy. This arrangement is 
similar to the four-layer hierarchy of the TCP/IP protocol model for data 
communication, as shown in Figure 3. Following is a short description of the 
SS7 protocol levels: 
The Message Transfer Part (MTP) provides reliable transport of signaling 
messages across the SS7 network. MTP consists of the following three levels: 
• MTP I: Signaling Data Link corresponds to the lower half of network 
access layer of the TCP/IP protocol model, and defines the physical and 
other functional characteristics of the signaling links. 
• MTP 2: Signaling Link corresponds to the upper half of the network access 
layer of the TCP/IP protocol model, and provides reliable transfer of 
signaling messages between signaling point. 
• MTP 3: Signaling Network corresponds to the lower half of Internet layer 
of the TCP/IP protocol model, and provides routing functionalities. 
SS7 Layer SS7 Protocol Model 
ASE 1 OMAP 
TCAP 





MTP 3 (Sipling Network) 
MTP 2 (Signaling Link) 
MTP I (Sipling Data Link) 









Figure 2. SS7 Protocol Model and TCPnP Model 
Signaling Connection Control Part (SCCP) corresponds to the upper half of 
the Internet layer of the TCP/IP protocol model, and provides functions to 
transfer non-trunk related messages such as database access. SCCP enhances the 
MTP 3 services by providing connectionless and connection-oriented classes of 
services. The combination of MTP and SCCP is known as the Network Services 
Part (NSP) ofSS7. 
Telephone User Part (TUP) is a protocol that provides call control, trunk 
maintenance, and call setup resources to the telephone network. 
ISDN User Part (ISUP) is a protocol that provides call control, trunk 
maintenance, and call setup resources to the telephone network and the ISDN. 
North America uses !SUP and the rest of the world uses the TUP. 
Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP) is a connectionless remote 
procedure call (RPC) that allows one signaling point to invoke an operation to 
another signaling point and then use the response. It operates at the application 
of OSI protocol model, and provides a standard interface to the application 
service elements (ASE). 
The Operation, Maintenance, and administration part (OMAP) is an 
application of TCAP and it provides the operations required to monitor, 
coordinate, and control of the telephone network. 
The Application Service Element (ASE) is an application of TCAP. It is user 
specific services such as Mobile application Part (MAP). 
4 Proposed Security Enhancement 
The proposed security enhancement consists of certificate authorities (CA), 
authentication centers (AC) and telephone with cryptographic capabilities on top 
of the existing public telephone network infrastructure as shown in Figure 3. 
The CA and AC are to be implemented at the application service element (ASE) 
of the SS7 protocol model. CA is responsible for generating publidprivate keys, 
creating digital certificate of public keys, and storing the digital certificates in 
the publicly available database as well as interfacing with other CA's in the 
public telephone network. In addition, it is responsible for maintaining the 
certificate revocation list (CRL), which contains the list of compromised and 
expired keys. A digital certificate is a record that binds the device's public key 
to the device's identity and is signed by the CA. Digital certificate usually 
contains other information beside public key and identification, as defined in 











AC is responsible for generating and distributing the encryption keys, and 
authenticating telephones and subscribers. It is also responsible for maintaining 
the authentication database, which contains the subscriber's profiles. Subscriber 
profile contains the subscriber identification and its corresponding requested 
password as well as other information related to subscriber. AC interfaces with 
other AC's in the public telephone network to service roaming subscribers. 
Proposed security enhancements assume that every telephone company 
establishes a certificate authority (CA) and every CA cross-certifies with other 
CA's in the telephone network. This cross-certification is only valid for 
connection process, and allows a telephone or AC in a telephone company's 
domain to communicate securely with other telephones or AC's in a different 
telephone company's domain. We now describe authentication services in detail. 
4.1 Authentication 
Proposed security enhancement uses public key cryptography to achieve 
authentication and key distribution. The public key cryptography uses 
public/private key pair. The private key is a secret key and is only known by its 
owner, while the public key is publicly available. CA generates the 
publidprivate key pair and the digital certificate of AC. It stores the digital 
certificate of AC in a publicly available database, and stores AC's public/private 
key pair in a secure file in the AC server. 
Whenever a subscriber requests a telephone service, the CA generates the 
publidprivate key pair and a digital certificate of the telephone. It stores the 
digital certificate of the telephone in the telephone profile as well as a publicly 
available database. Then, the CA installs the telephone's public/private key pair 
and CA's digital certificate in the telephone at the telephone company. The 
telephone profile contains other information in addition to public/private key 
pairs. It can be stored in line information database (LIDB) for PSTN telephones 
and in home location register (HLR) for the wireless phone. The subscriber does 
not know the telephone's public/private key pair. When a private key is 
compromised, the CA will revoke it and store it in a CRL as well as in the 
telephone profile. Then it generates a new key pair. 
At the time of the secure service request, the subscriber will have to selects 
one ID and password pair, and the AC stores them in subscriber profile. The 
subscriber profile can be stored in the authentication database that resides in the 
AC. A subscriber, who subscribes to the secure service, can use any secure 
telephone to get voice privacy. There are two types of authentication in the 
secure archilecture: syslem (device) authenticalion and subscriber 
authentication. System authentication is used to authenticate the telephone and 
the AC, and the subscriber authentication is used to authenticate the subscriber 
who requested the secure connection. 
4.1.1 System Authentication 
Either the telephone or the AC can initiate the system authentication and it 
is transparent to the subscriber. However, it will be mostly used by the AC to 
authenticate the telephone as illustrated in Figure 4 (a). The following steps 
describe telephone authentication technique: 
l. AC generates a random number (R), and it encrypts R with AC's private 
key (K
0
Ac) using the encryption algorithm (E) to obtain signed R (SAc), [i.e. 
S..1c=EK·.u:(R)J. 
2. The AC sends SAc to the telephone over the control channel for the digital 
subscriber line and voice channel for the analog line. 
3. When the telephone receives SAc. it decrypts SAc with AC's public key 
(KAc) using the decryption algorithm (0) to recover R. [i.e. R ==DKAc 
(S,u:J=DKAc (E K"AC (R))J. 
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4. The telephone performs the same technique as step I to sign the decrypted 
R, [i.e. Sr = E K•r (R}], and then sends Sr to the AC. 
S. When the AC receives Sr, it performs the same technique as step 3 to 
decrypt the original R. [i.e. R == DKT(Sr}= DA.7 (E K•r (R))]. 
AC Public key 





L.0 Signed Random# 




• G ~Random# 
a) Challenge·Response Authentication 
Subscriber AC Public key AC Private key ID&P 
+ + + 
ID&P 0 
C=EKAC(ID&P) ? .. 0~ 
Encrypted ID & P ID&P 
b) Subscriber Authentication 
Figure 4. Authentication Techniques In Secure Architecture 
This technique provides the AC the assurance that the random number 
response came from the telephone. Thus, the telephone is allowed to receive 
services from the network. 
4.1.2 Subscriber Authentication 
When the calling subscriber requests secure connection, the AC initiates the 
subscriber authentication as illustrale in Figure 4(b). The following steps 
describes subscriber authentication: 
• The subscriber requests the secure connection, and in response, the 
inleractive voice response (JVR) at the end office inslruct the subscriber to 
enter the subscriber's ID and password (ID&P) pair over the voice channel. 
• Once the subscriber enters the ID&P, the telephone encrypts the ID&P with 
AC's public key (KAc) using the encryption algorithm E to obtain encrypted 
ID&P say C, [i.e. C - E KAC (ID&P)] and sends C to the AC over the 
control channel or digital subscriber lines and voice channel of analog lines. 
• When the AC receives C, it decrypts C with AC's private (K"Ac) using the 
decryption algorithm D to recover ID&P, [i.e. ID&P ... DK·Ac(C)v DK·Ac (E 
KAC (/D&P))). 
The AC verifies the JD&P received with the ID&P in the authentication 
database. Ir verified to be correct, the calling subscriber is allowed to receive a 
secure connection. Otherwise, the subscriber is denied a secure connection. 
Once the calling subscriber is authenticated, the AC authenticates the called 
subscriber using the same steps as those described in this section (4. I .2). 
4.2 Voice Privacy 
Voice privacy is achieved by encrypting the voice signals between the two 
end telephones using a symmetric key algorithm as illustrate in Figure 5. Voice 
encryption starts when the telephone and calling subscriber are authenticated, 
and the called subscriber accepted the secure connection request. The following 
steps describes voice encryption: 
• The AC generates encryption key KE, and it encrypts KE with the 
corresponding telephone's public key K using the encryption algorithm E to 
obtain encrypted KE called C, [i.e. C - EK(KF)]. It sends C to the telephones 
over the control channel for the digital subscriber line and voice channel for 
the analog line. 
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• When the telephone receives C, it decrypts C with telephone's private key 
K
0 
using the decryption algorithm D to recover KE, [i.e. KE .,. DK.(C)=> DK· 
(EK (KF))), and uses it to encrypt/decrypt the voice signals using a secret key 
algorithm E & D 
Key KE is only valid during the call in progress, and once the call is 
terminaled, the key is destroyed. There is no restriction on the key size, and it 
depends on the encryption algorithm. If the KE is compromised during the call 
and the call is on analog subscriber line the call must be disconnected. If KE is 
compromised during the call and the call is on digital subscriber line, the AC 
will generale a new KE and sends to the telephone over the control channel. Once 
the telephone receives the new key KE. it destroys the compromised key and uses 
the new key. 
MS 1 
MS Gencra1cd One 
Public ~cy t ime Key <KJ 










Figure 5. Voice Privacy in the Secure Architecture 
- - - - - -
5 Integrating Proposed Security Enhancement into the 
PSTN Call Processing Model 
In PSTN, call processing involves setting up, monitoring, and releasing the 
connection as well as managing other features related to the call. As described in 
section 3, the signaling protocol is responsible for the call processing. The basic 
call-processing model (BCM) comprises into originating and tenninating call 
processing [5,7,15). 
Authorizing origination Authorizing origim1tion 
Collecting infonmtion Seclecting facility 
Analyzing infonmtion Presenting Call 
Authorizing call setup 
.--------__ t __ ---------, 
- , Kc' \ l.111a".:1!n11.·111 ~--
L--- - ----- · 1--=---- ---~ 
Trunk Setup Active 
Waiting for answer Release Pending 
a) Originating Basic Call model b) Terminating Basic Call model 
Figure 6. Call-Processing Model with Proposed Enhancements 
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A simplified BCM with the proposed security enhancement states is shown 
in Figure 6 and the proposed states are shown in broken rectangular edges. The 
originating call-processing model {OCM) defines states for call processing 
related to the calling subscriber, and consists of ten original states and one 
proposed security enhancement state as shown in Figure 6. The tennination call-
processing model (TCM) defines states for call processing related to the called 
subscriber, and consists of seven original states and two proposed security 
enhancement states as shown in Figure 6. Each state in OCM and TCM 
represent a sequence of actions that SSP needs to perfonn at that point in 
processing the call. For all or some of the states, SSP may launch a query 
(initiate a transaction with) the service control point (SCP) or other devices such 
as authentication center (AC), elc, to receive instruction on how to handle the 
call at that point. When SSP initiates a transaction with SCP, SSP suspends the 
call processing and moves into wait state. 
The mechanism, which SSP initiates a transaction with SCP through its 
local STP to obtain instruction to process the call, is referred as triggering. The 
mechanism, which SCP responds to the trigger, is referred as call-handling 
instruction. BCM uses TCAP messages and typical TCAP message flow 
between SSP and SCP is shown in Figure 7. 
SCP 
SSP DB Access 
Service Service I I 
'i TCAP STP TCAP T I 
! : SCCP SCCP SCCP I I 
1: MTP T ~ne T MTP T I 




Figure 7. Typical TCAP message now 
, 
The aforementioned provides a brief overview of the basic call-processing 
model and we now provide detail description of the proposed security 
enhancement states in BCM as shown in Figure 8, 9, and IO. Jn Figure 8, S1 lifts 
(Off-hook) the handset of the telephone, the call process starts, and SSP1 
responds with a dial tone to Si. and moves from null to colleting state. S1 dials 
the secure connection code and the S2 number. SSP1 collects all the dialed 
numbers from S1 and then moves to analyzing state. Jn this state, SSP1 
encounters subscriber authentication request and it initiates subscriber 
authentication transaction with AC to obtain call-handling instruction. Then 
SSP1 moves to wait state where it waits the response from AC. In response, AC 
sends "send to resource, caller interaction (STR-1)" instruction to SSP., moves 
to wait state where it stays until the response from SSP 1 arrives. SRT-J 
instruction indicates that AC needs to interact with S1• 
When SSP1 receives STR-1 instruction, it moves to caller interaction state 
where SSP1 connects S1 's line to intelligent-network service circuit (JNSC), 
which plays the authentication announcement. The authentication announcement 
instructs S1 to enter the password digits. JNSC collects the password digits and 
SSP1 sends them to AC in a resource clear message. SSP1 moves to wait state 
and it stays there until a new instruction from AC arrives. When AC receives 
S1 's password from SSP,, it retrieves S1 's password from the authentication 
database, compares it with the received S1 's password from SSP1• If AC 
authenticates Si. AC sends authenticated (AUTH-SUB) message to SSP., and 
moves to wait state. In response, SSP1 moves from wait to selecting route state 
to continue the secure call processing. Otherwise, AC sends disconnect (DISC) 
message and in response SSP., goes to disconnect state where SSP1 plays 
termination announcement. Termination announcement requests SI to hung up 
because SI is not authorize to make the call. 
Figure 9 assumes that the call step up has been completed and S2 has lifted 
the handset of the telephone. When S2 answers the telephone, SSP2 initiates 
subscriber authentication transaction with AC, and SSP2 moves to wait state. In 
response, AC sends STR-1 instruction to SSP2, and moves to wait state where it 
stays until the response from SSP1 arrives. Upon the receipt of STR-1 instruction, 
SSP2 moves to caller interaction state, and connects S2's line INSC, which plays 
the authentication announcement, and collects the password digits. Then SSP2 
sends the password to AC, and moves to wait state. When AC receives S2's 
password from SSP2, it compares with the one in the authentication database. If 
the two passwords do not match, AC sends disconnect (DISC) message to SSP1 
and SSP2. In response, Both SSP1 and SSP2 move to disconnect state where they 
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plays termination announcement. Otherwise, AC sends secure call instruction to 
both SSP1 and SSP2, and moves to moves to key management state. Upon the 
receipt secure call instruction, both SSP1 and SSP2 move to secure call state 
where they play secure call announcement to S1 and S2• In key management 
state, AC generates, encrypts with corresponding the telephone's public key, and 
distributes one-time encryption key to both telephone via SSP1 and SSP2• 
[; 0 6 B 
s, SSP1 AC DB 
Enlcring Digits Collecting 
Digits 
PSSW-REQ 




























Figure 10 illustrates a simplified secure call set up between telephones (S1 
and S2) on analog line in the PSTN. In order to distinguish secure and normal 
message, we used the broken lines to represent secure messages and solid lines 
to represent normal messages. The steps of the simplified secure call set up 
shown in Figure IO is as follows: 
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Figure 10. Simplified Secure Call Set up 
S, diols the secure connection code and the S2 number and SSP1 collects all 
the numbers. SSP1 examines the dialed numbers and send authorization 
message to AC. 
2 AC sends request for ID & password to S1 via interactive voice response 
(IVR), and then evaluates the received ID and password. AC instructs SSP1 
to continue secure call setup if S1 is authenticated. Otherwise AC instructs 
SSP,to disconnect lhe call. 
3 SSP1 identifies an available trunk and send secure connection request to 
SSP2. 
4 SSP2 examines the received message from SSP., and alerts S2. 
5 Once S2 answers, SSP2 send connection complete message to SSP1 and 
sends authorization request to AC. 
6 AC sends request for password to S2 via interactive voice response (IVR), 
and then evaluates the received ID and password. AC generates and 
distributes encryption key if S2 is authenticated. Otherwise, AC instructs 
SSP1 and SSP2 to disconnect the call. 
7 S 1 and S2 use the encryption key to encrypt and decrypt the voice signal. 
When the connection is released, the encryption key is destroyed. 
6 Conclusions 
We hove described an architectural enhancement necessary to provide end-
to-end voice privacy at the application layer with minimum modification to 
existing public telephone networks. Voice privacy is achieved by encrypting 
voice signals between the two end telephones using a symmetric key algorithm 
and one-time encryption keys. One-time encryption key is used to prevent replay 
attacks. In addition, we have described authentication techniques for subscribers 
and telephones. Telephone authentication technique provides AC the assurance 
that the telephone at the other end of the connection is what it claims to be. 
Finally, we described how to integrate voice privacy technique with PSTN and 
wireless network. Our ongoing work addresses perfonnance issues and an 
efficient PKJ infrastructure over SS7. The summary of the comparison between 
the proposed security enhancement and the most widely used security 
architectures in telephony is given in table I. 
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Proposed IS-41 Security GSM 
security Security 
enhancement 
Devices Yes Yes Yes 
Authentication 
Subscriber Yes No No 
Authentication 
Voice Privacy between Yes Yes Yes 
the telephone and SSP 
or MSC 
End-to-End Voice Yes No No 
Privacy 
One time encryption Yes Not Always Not Always 
key 
Device Authentication Digital MAC MAC 
Technig_ue Signature 
Subscriber Public Key Not Available Not 
Authentication Cryptography Available 
Technique 
Voice Privacy Secret Key Combination Secret Key 
Technique Cryptography of MAC and Encryption 
"XOR" 
(MAC 1s stand for message authentication code and XOR is siand for exclusive or) 
Table t. Comparison between the proposed security enhancement and 
existing security architectures 
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